condemns or justifies such acts. Arguably, it would help the ICC in asserting the legitimacy of its judgments, if it was able to prove that such judgments are compatible with the legal and belief system recognised by the actors at trial. In turn it would enable the Court to deal with at least some of the criticism aimed at it, for being an imperialistic institution.
Nigeria. 28 of these were included in the preliminary examination. 2 The Court publicly announced that it was undertaking a preliminary examination into events in Nigeria on 18
November 2010. At the invitation of the Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, the OTP undertook a mission to Nigeria in July 2012, and gathered information on the attacks which had been attributed to Boko Haram. 3 Following on from this mission, the OTP determined . 3 See Office of the Prosecutor, 'Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012', available online at <http://www.icccpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20r ef/pages/report-on-preliminary-examination-activities-2012.aspx> (visited 9 September 2013), at para. 93. 4 See The Office of the Prosecutor, 'Situation in Nigeria Article 5 Report', available online at <http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/docs/SAS%20-%20NGA%20-%20Public%20version%20Article%205%20Report%20-%2005%20August%202013.PDF> (visited 18 September 2013), at para. 15. 5 Ibid at para. 15 and see also paras 46-51 6 Office of the Prosecutor, supra n 3, at paras 214-218.
Boko Haram claim that they are immune from prosecution as these crimes were committed during the context of jihād? Who can declare jihād and against whom this can be declared?
Are the alleged crimes committed by these groups prohibited under Islamic law? Answers to these questions will provide important guidance to the ICC as it proceeds with the Nigerian situation. In the past the Court has been heavily criticised as an imperialist institution, imposing a Westernised view of justice on African states. In order to counter some of these criticisms the Court needs to be open to an analysis of the implementation of Shari'a law in situations and cases where it is relevant, such as in Nigeria. This will help to legitimise the Court's decisions and judgments.
Section 2 of this paper traces the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria and discusses the motivations of this group. It describes some of its violent activities and the reactions of the Nigerian government and armed forces. It also explores the incorporation of Shari'a based rules into the Nigerian legal system. Section 3 provides an analysis of Boko Haram's jihādī ideology, how the practice of suicide attacks was misrepresented as martyrdom to the impressionable followers of this group, and the criminal liability of those who incited the commission of such attacks under Islamic law.
Nigeria and the Rise of Boko Haram
Nigeria is a federation of 36 states, and a federal capital territory of Abuja, with 168 million inhabitants; making it the most populous country in Africa. 7 It has almost 350 ethnic groups, speaking about 250 different languages. 8 About 50% of the population are Muslim, 40% are Christian, and 10% follow traditional African religions. 9 Most Muslims live in North-Nigeria, whereas Christians and the traditional African religions believers inhabit the southern half of the country. 10 The southern part of the country has primarily been influenced by western politics, education, culture and economy. See also The Office of the Prosecutor, supra n 3, at para.18. 8 Brinkel and Ait-Hida, supra n 7, 8. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 
The Implementation of Shari'a in Nigeria
Nigeria's legal system is founded on common law principles, a legacy of its past as a British colony. Prior to colonisation, however, the law applicable in the territory was based on custom. In the northern part of modern day Nigeria, the majority of the population was -and still is -Muslim, and thus the local laws were based on Islam. During colonial times, both common law rules, in the form of received English law, and customary law rules, including
Shari'a law in the north, were applied in relation to civil law issues, as long as they was not repugnant to English law. 64 Shari'a courts, 'area courts', 65 Another difficulty with the implementation of Shari'a law was that because the police are a federal institution in Nigeria, no institution could enforce these penalties. This led to the rise of vigilante groups who would 'operate primarily in the cities against individuals or groups who were, or were perceived to be, violating shari'a norms.' 76 Thus, the implementation of Shari'a law led to dissatisfaction among many Nigerians which resulted in violent ethnic clashes and the loss of many lives in some parts of the region. However, a number of legal questions remain as to the legality of imposing Shari'a law in the northern states of Nigeria, including the validity of such a move given that Article 10 of the 99 According to Haykal, this Ḥadīth is: "The house of Islam constitutes the source of inviolability for its residents, and the house of polytheism constitutes the source of violability for its residents." Haykal states this 'Ḥadīth' is only cited by al-Mawardī, and is not found in the authentic collections of Aḥādīth. M Haykal, supra n 96, 660. 100 Namely, the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. According to Khadduri, 'The classical theory of the Islamic law of nations is found neither in the Qur'ān nor in the Prophet's utterances, although its basic assumptions were derived from these authoritative sources; it was rather the product of Islamic juridical speculation at the height of Islamic power.' M Khadduri (trans), The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybānī's Siyar (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland 1966), 19. 101 Ibid, 194. was certainly a determining factor in forming this dichotomous vision, as well as the binary division of jihād into two modalities: defensive and offensive.
Moreover, the "international" un-Qur'ānic classical division of the world cannot, in our view, be justifiably transferred and adopted to a completely different modern multi-faiths Nigerian 
Inciting to and Committing Suicide
Through their emotionally-driven inciting rhetoric, religious leaders undisputedly goad their followers to violence. They even, sometimes, 'increase the likelihood of conflict onset.' 130 As for the second signature issue, it can be stated that while Boko Haram members think that they may not contribute to feeding religious violence, the skewed religious discourse they employ makes them religiously responsible for fomenting religious tension that eventually lure their adherents to commit suicide in the name of Islam. I recommend to you that you fear Allah and obey Him. When you engage the enemies do not loot, do not mutilate the dead, do not commit treachery, do not behave cowardly, do not kill children, the elderly or women, do not burn trees or damage crops, and do not kill an animal unless lawfully acquired for food.
You will come across men confined to hermitages in which they claim to have dedicated their lives to worshipping God, leave them alone. 154 If the above quotation is meant for enemy combatants, it is prohibited, a fortiori, for Boko
Haram members to commit such suicide attacks in which, according to Cook, civilians are frequently killed. 155 Thirdly, in their suicide attacks, properties belonging to others are destroyed which is also a prohibited act that is considered, according to the Qur'ān 5:33, corruption (fasād).
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According to al-Shaʽrāwī, the 'fasād' in this verse generally refers to the prohibition of causing corruption to humans by targeting them as well as destroying fauna and flora. To answer the first question, it is essential to state that crime (jarīmah) in Islamic law refers to a prohibited act for which Allah sets a deterring punishment either through a fixed penalty (ḥadd) or through a discretionary one (taʽzīr). 160 It is submitted that the crimes committed by members of Boko Haram, discussed above, fall within the category of ḥudūd (pl. ḥadd);
namely the crime of ḥirābah (brigandage, banditry, highway robbery); which is an essential category of ḥudūd within the Islamic criminal law system stricto sensu. 161 Within the Sunnī legal theory, there are three terms that are widely used for ḥirābah; the first is ḥirābah itself, the second is qaṭʽ al-Ṭarīq (highway robbery), and the third is sariqah kubrā (great theft, larceny). 162 The first term is employed here because of its strong relevance and similarity to This element is considered the greatest common denominator between ḥirābah and terrorism because it is a distinctive characteristic of both crimes. 164 Second, causing corruption (fasād). 165 Third, based on the Qur'ānic verses 5:32-33 Al-Shaʽrāwī argues that fasād is of two types. In the first type, the perpetrator personally attempts to take revenge for a previous aggression against him initiated by the other party, which is a common occurrence with Boko Haram.
This personal revenge, according to al-Shaʽrāwī, is prohibited not because it is reciprocating aggression, but because of the violation of Islamic law, which prohibits people from taking the law into their own hands. They would be applying their own laws, disregarding the authoritative bodies appointed to settle personal grudges primarily through legal channels.
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The second type, according to al-Shaʽrāwī, is the terrorisation of people with whom there is no cause for dispute. Examples of this are the Boko Haram attacks against both church and Mosque goers. According to al-Shaʽrāwī, this is the most apt example of ḥirābah, 172 as it perfectly relates to the essence of the two verses referred to. Indeed, this description of ḥirābah generally corresponds to terrorism as in this latter example there is also no dispute between the terrorist\suicide bomber and his innocent victims. The targets are targeted not because of their own status, but to subdue those in authority, such as rulers or governments, so that they succumb to the perpetrators' demands. This is also a clear example of Boko
Haram practice. Therefore, the violent acts of Boko Haram in Nigeria are considered ḥirābah acts based on the above definition and the extracted elements. Accepting the common view that the classical ḥirābah crime 'corresponds in its most salient features' to the modern crime of terrorism, 173 the current practices of Boko Haram members especially those related to the main elements of ḥirābah discussed above are all punishable acts of terrorism according to international law and Islamic law.
As far as the Islamic law is concerned, if the alleged members of Boko Haram proved to be guilty of committing acts of ḥirābah-which has been proven to be slightly different from or almost identical to modern perverted acts of terrorism-and are to be tried before a court which applies solely Islamic law, then the punishments for ḥirābah applies to them.
Interestingly, the punishments are mentioned in the following Qur'ānic verses:
Those who wage war against God and His Messenger and strive to spread corruption in the land should be punished by death, crucifixion, the amputation of an alternate hand and foot, or banishment from the land: a disgrace for them in this world, and then a terrible punishment in the Hereafter, unless they repent before you overpower them-in that case bear in mind that God is forgiving and merciful. 174 Classical and modern Qur'ān interpreters and jurists are in agreement that the punishments mentioned in the above verse (Qur'ān 5:33) are the prescribed punishments for ḥirābah. The punishments are execution, crucifixion, the amputation of a hand and a foot on opposite sides, or banishment from the land. There are two main approaches to these four alternative punishments. 175 The first approach seeks to establish proportionality between the crime and the punishment, whereas the second approach authorises the Muslim ruler to use his discretion in applying the punishment. Abou El Fadl calls the first approach 'tartīb' and the second 'takhyīr'. 176 These punishments are considered the most severe punishments in Islam. 177 It has become clear now that the Qur'ān does not condone terrorist acts. Indeed, terrorist acts are crimes for which the most severe punishments are prescribed. The four alternative punishments, ranging from execution to exile, are set as a deterrent for heinous crimes committed by Boko Haram members and similar groups committing the same acts. Although the punishment may seem cruel at first glance, this falls into perspective when the interest of the whole society is taken into consideration. 178 Finally, the four worldly punishments for terrorism put forward by the Qur'ān above, provide workable mechanisms for those in authority if they want a moral and practical basis to combat terrorism.
General Remarks and Conclusion
The There is no room in Islamic law for excuses or justification for such atrocious acts and Shari'a confers on every citizen the right to refuse to commit a crime, should any government or administrator order him to do so. 181 The Prophet is reported to have said 'there is no obedience in transgression: obedience is required in righteousness.' 182 As noted by Bassiouni, 'Islam rejects the postulate the ends justify the means because it is a religion grounded in values that require that ends and means conform to its specific dictates, and to its higher values and principles.' 183 His observations on the contemporary meaning of jihad are very significant to our current discourse:
In the last 40 years, jihad as political violence has become nothing more than a revolutionary doctrine to justify those who engage in it by appealing to the legitimacy of their self-proclaimed ends. The theological technique used to achieve this ends is to cherry-pick among verses of the Quran, the Hadith (the sayings of the Prophet), historic events and practices, fatwa(s), and theological pronouncements. This technique, which is contrary to the accepted techniques of 'ilm usul al-fiqh, and also contrary to fiqh (doctrine), has permitted all sorts of self-serving interpretations, which are essentially distortions of the Shari'a. Those who engage in this method use a discourse of political rhetoric couched in theological terms that blurs the distinction between the lawful and the unlawful. The rhetoric, however, becomes powerful in it popular effect.
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The study also reveals that armed jihad can only be declared by a lawful authority 'which is to be granted when the country is threatened with invasion'. In his survey on the doctrinal prescriptions of Islam in the conduct of foreign policy Gene W.
Heck arrived to the following conclusion:
In short, as its roots, Islam rightly prides itself as a "religion of tolerance" ("dīn altasāmuh") and there is little within its doctrine to suggest otherwise. As such, the practices of modern terrorist groups that purport to operate under its banner may be seen as antithetical to its very teachings.
For in its prescriptions, Qur'ānic doctrine directly refutes, rather than supports, the modern tactics of militant "jihadi" networks. This is the most critical of findings. For recognition of this reality is critical to any strategy that seeks t mitigate the spread of terrorism and spare future generations from the nihilism of terror now perpetrated in Islam's sacred name. 189 Islam also prohibits accusing others of disbelieve or takfīr an infidelizing ideology which has been adopted by some members of Boko Haram for achieving personal aims and political As for the acts of spreading terror amongst civilians and the indiscriminate and systematic killings of civilians and children as practiced and continued to be practiced by members of
Boko Haram the present study arrived to the conclusion that these acts amount to the crime of hirābah, a had (pl. hudūd) crime explicitly proscribed in the Qur'ān where punishment is mandatory. 194 It is worth pointing out that the deadly attacks against school children and the The primary purpose of the ICC is to provide justice for victims of such heinous crimes as those suffered by Nigerian civilians at the hands of Boko Haram. However the selection of certain situations and not others for prosecution before the ICC has drawn heavy criticism on the Court. Adding to this the choice of mainly western inspired law to be applied at the Court makes the institution seem even more imperialistic and can damage the perception of its legitimacy in Africa and elsewhere. With the appointment of the first African jurist to be the Court's prosecutor, the ICC seems to be trying to change its image of 'white people prosecuting black people' however one could argue that a stronger step away from the perceived imperialistic patronising attitude would be for the Court to acknowledge the cultures and legal systems of the countries from which the situations stem. If the Nigerian investigations eventually lead to prosecution, the acknowledgement in all phases of the trial that these crimes are not merely criminalized in the international or western legal systems, but also under Islamic Law, would prove that the Court is truly universal, that it has the knowledge and respect for different cultures and legal systems, even if it does not strictly apply their laws and last but not least it would give a sense of dignity to the victims themselves.
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